Who Broke the Box?
Change & identity forensic trails
The scenario
The server is acting strange and nobody changed anything - which is true at the human level and false at the physical level. Someone plugged a Wi-Fi adapter into the rack PDU switch port's management VLAN. A cron entry appeared in root's crontab. `PermitRootLogin` quietly became `yes`. The audit log you needed did not exist because nothing was watching for change. These apps *are* the watchers, and the deltas they emit are timeline evidence on your side.
The app recipe
Problems this kills
- "Nothing changed" investigations - device deltas put a timestamp on "something changed."
- Rogue USB mass storage appearing on a locked-down box.
- Security posture degrading through config drift rather than an incident.
- The discovery window for compromised identity configs collapsing from "months" to "next interval."
Killer searches
Every physical device insertion/removal on any box, last 7 days (new vs removed per host):
index=main sourcetype=devfleet:status device_delta>0 earliest=-7d latest=now
| table _time host device_delta new_devices removed_devices
| head 20All change-relevant alarms across every change app in one table:
index=main sourcetype=baseline:status OR sourcetype=authid:status OR sourcetype=cronbeat:status
status=alarm latest=now
| table host sourcetype
| dedup host sourcetypeTimer/jobs inventory drift (the unexpected scheduled task):
index=main sourcetype=cronbeat:status latest=now
| table host status cron_jobs timers_total timers_stale
| dedup hostWho this is for
Security-minded sysadmins, incident responders with no SIEM budget, and anyone who has ever asked "when did that USB drive appear?" to an empty room.